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1. Introduction
The study of dreams relies upon memory for dream experi-
ences, as there is (as yet) no method of measuring dreams 
objectively. Hence, in order to investigate dreams, it is nec-
essary to comprehend the processes involved in remem-
bering them. If much detail of a dream memory is lost, it is 
difficult to ascertain the validity of the original dream ex-
perience. Unfortunately the distinction between character-
istics of a dream memory as defined distinctly from a dream 
experience is rarely acknowledged in the dream literature. 
Applying knowledge of waking memory to dream memories 
enables an understanding of the extent to which we can 
trust reports of dream experiences. 
Memories for dreams can be compared to memories for 
waking experiences. We may assume that dreams are epi-
sodic memories (Conway, 2001; Tulving, 1983) – specific 
memories for an experience or an event – however dreams 
are likely not encoded in the same way as waking experi-
ences due to the relative attenuation of the brain, in particu-
lar the frontal lobes whilst asleep (Braun et al., 1997; Hob-
son, Stickgold & Pace-Schott, 1998; Hobson et al., 2000; 
Maquet, 2000; see also Horton, 2008). There is therefore 
reason to believe that the characteristics of dream and wak-
ing memories could differ. Dreams are experientially differ-
ent to waking memories, experienced when in a somewhat 
different physiological environment, and likely not immedi-
ately encoded as memories. It follows that dreams that are 
reported in a diary paradigm are transferred into a verbal 
account whilst in the waking state. This relies upon memory 
construction processes (Cicogna, 1983; Cipolli, Calasso, 
Maccolini, Pani & Salzarulo, 1984), rendering dreams more 
comparable to autobiographical memories than episodic 
memories (Conway, 1990; 2005; 2009; Horton, 2008; Hor-
ton & Conway, 2009; Horton, Kahan & Svob, 2010; Horton, 
Moulin & Conway, 2009). The present paper explores the 
memory profile of dreams in comparison to waking events, 
in terms of their characteristics at the time of reporting as 
well as those at the time of retrieval.
Autobiographical memories are considered to be con-
structed in accordance with the self, whilst episodic memo-
ries may replay an experience, to some extent, especially 
if retrieved with autonoetic consciousness, or recollective 
experience (Tulving, 1983). A small body of research has 
demonstrated the overlap between autobiographical mem-
ory functioning and dreaming (Botman & Croviz, 1989-90; 
Cappeliez, 2008; Grenier et al., 2005; Horton, 2008; Horton 
& Conway, 2009). In addition Fosse, Fosse, Hobson and 
Stickgold (2003) argue that episodic memories are not re-
played during dreaming but, rather, that fragments of auto-
biographical information may be activated in the sleeping 
brain (see also Horton et al., 2009). This indicates that epi-
sodic memory may not function whilst asleep in the same 
way as whilst awake. Indeed, the autobiographical memo-
ry system may also likely operate differently in the sleep-
ing brain. This leads to the idea that the development of 
dreams as memories may differ from the development of 
memories for waking experiences. Relatively little has been 
investigated in a systematic and rigorous manner in terms of 
autobiographical memory functioning and dream recall. The 
present paper explores the nature of dreams as episodic 
memories, by employing a recollective experience para-
digm at retrieval (Dewhurst & Conway, 1994; Gardiner, 1988; 
Tulving, 1983). This aimed to determine whether dreams are 
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less likely to be retrieved as episodic memories, compared 
to memories for waking events. 
Various models of dream generation acknowledge that, 
for dream memories, the sleeping brain renders it difficult 
for an experience such as a dream to be encoded during 
or shortly after its occurrence. However when retrieved, 
the waking brain is substantially more active. In contrast, 
waking memories can be consciously (as well as non-con-
sciously) encoded and retrieved. This may give rise to a 
recall advantage for waking memories over dream memo-
ries, especially if they have been rehearsed whilst awake 
(Horton, 2008; Horton et al., 2010). Although investigating 
dreams as memories cannot allow processes of dream gen-
eration to be inferred, exploring the retrieval of dreams as 
memories can provide insight into how dreams differ from 
waking memories, thus allowing memory theory to inform 
dream science. On the basis of our current understanding of 
dreams, one could predict that dream memories are likely to 
be less recallable than waking event memories. 
Support for these ideas come from findings that dreams 
are rarely easily recalled (e.g. Reed, 1974) and that waking 
memories seem to be far richer in characteristic detail than 
dream memories (Johnson, Kahan & Raye, 1984; Kemp & 
Burt, 2006; Kemp et al., 2003). That is, studies have gen-
erally found that dreams contain less perceptual and con-
textual detail than memories for actual experiences. These 
differences imply that dreams are difficult to encode and 
are thus less recallable and less detailed than comparable 
waking experiences. Of course some dream memories must 
be encoded, whether whilst asleep or upon awakening, as it 
is possible to recall some dreams. Characteristic measures 
of memories allow the strength of the memory trace to be 
investigated, as do measures of memory detail, such as 
report length. We could assume that the characteristics of 
dream memories will be less strong and intense than those 
for waking event memories. 
An alternative view then is that dreams are encoded but 
become more difficult to retrieve over time. Kemp, Burt 
and Sheen (2003) indeed noted that dreams may become 
increasingly difficult to access over time. Thus one might 
predict that immediate dream recall upon awakening is 
easy, but that long-term dream memories decay (Parke & 
Horton, 2009). Presenting more cues at retrieval would al-
low a deeper investigation of the strength of the possibly 
decaying memory trace, over time. Recognition tasks, as 
opposed to recall tasks (the latter requiring memories to be 
brought to mind spontaneously with minimal cues) provide 
a potential method of investigation. Thus it would follow that 
the ability to recognize elements of dream memories may 
be comparable to that for waking memories, even if recall is 
more difficult for dream memories. 
It is unclear as to whether dreams and waking experi-
ences display the same recall and recognition trends over 
time. That is, are dreams similarly recognizable and recall-
able than events, or more so? Work from our laboratory 
has demonstrated that retrospectively experienced dreams 
are more difficult to recall freely than waking events (Hor-
ton, 2008), however it is not clear as to whether the dream 
memory trace has vanished entirely. If the latter, recognition 
of dreams would be problematic also. If the memory trace 
exists and is simply difficult to access, recognition rather 
than recall may facilitate retrieving details of that dream. 
One notable investigation employed recall as well as rec-
ognition measures of dream memories. Montangero, Ivani 
and de Saint-Hilaire (2003) directly compared the recall-
ability, as well as the characteristics, of dreams and wak-
ing memories. Waking memories were manipulated to be 
comparable to dreams in that dream-like films were created 
and presented to individuals when awoken at specific times 
in a sleep lab, so to be as similar to dreams as possible. 
Thus, dreams and the “events” (films) were compared ap-
propriately, as the films were presented to participants in 
the night, after they had been awakened 10 minutes after 
the second onset of REM sleep, when arousal levels and 
brain activity would be as comparable to the dreaming brain 
as possible. In addition, the films were viewed and recalled 
by the participants, being similar to experiencing a dream 
and then recalling it. More information was recalled in the 
morning, than when the original experience was recalled in 
the night, indicating that the experience could be communi-
cated coherently whilst awake. In the case of the films, the 
validity of the memories of the extra information could be 
verified, and was found to be accurate in most instances 
(86%). 
The findings of Montangero et al. (2003) implied that 
dream memories are accessible. This is largely contrary to 
many other studies on dream recall. However, Montangero 
et al. (2003) provided suitable memory cues in the form of 
event specific knowledge about the dreams and films, and 
their recent occurrence may have contributed to the dreams 
being more recallable than older dreams. The films also dif-
fer substantially from waking autobiographical experiences 
and typical waking event memories, upon which most aca-
demic understanding of memory is based. The investiga-
tion presented in the present paper measured recognition 
of waking event memories over a longer time scale, to see 
whether dream memories may be accessible in a similar 
manner and whether recall task performance would also be 
comparable.  
The present experiment explored recently recalled dreams 
and events (waking experience memories) in a diary para-
digm. Dreams and waking experiences were reported, and 
three weeks later a recall task explored whether memories 
had changed, i.e. whether information was lost over time. A 
subsequent recognition task one week later then investigat-
ed whether dreams might still be accessible episodically, as 
compared to waking events. Predictions were made about 
the memories’ characteristics, and recall and recognition 
trends. That is, dreams would be less detailed, episodi-
cally rich, positively emotional, salient and comprehensible 
than events, in line with previous findings (Johnson et al., 
1989; Kemp & Burt, 2006; Kemp et al., 2003). The episodic 
nature of these memories was assessed using a recollec-
tive experience paradigm. It was also hypothesized that 
dreams would be less recallable than waking events over 
time. Recognition scores were predicted not to differ be-
tween dreams and events, however, assuming that dream 
memories remain accessible (Montangero et al., 2003) if 
cued sufficiently. Furthermore, as the memory qualities of 
dreams and events were compared, the characteristics of 
those experiences that had been remembered in the recall 
phase, as distinct from those that were forgotten, were of 
interest to determine the characteristics that may be partic-
ularly important in determining the likelihood of subsequent 
recallability. No specific predictions were made concerning 
the comparisons of the characteristics of the remembered 
versus the forgotten reports, as these analyses were novel 
and exploratory.
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2. Methods 
2.1. Participants 
Email advertisements for the experiment were distributed 
to all undergraduate and postgraduate students at the In-
stitute of Psychological Sciences, University of Leeds. Re-
spondents were asked to participate in a dream diary study 
and were informed that they would be required to recall and 
report their dreams. They were asked if they usually recalled 
their dreams. Some participants reported that they strug-
gled with recall, but would engage with the study nonethe-
less. Initially 63 participants were recruited. 37 people man-
aged to record their dreams and events (26 were unable to 
recall the recommended minimum of five dreams). However 
only 25 completed the full tasks. 
Sample attrition was likely due to the length of the study 
and unexpected difficulties encountered when completing 
diaries at home. Specifically, some participants found it dif-
ficult to report their dreams, and some admitted that diary 
completion was troublesome to incorporate into a morn-
ing routine. This resulted in a sample consisting of 4 males 
and 21 females, likely of relatively high or motivated dream 
recallers. The mean age was 19 years. Participants were 
awarded with course credits and were paid £10 upon suc-
cessful full completion. The analyses reported here are for 
the 25 individuals who completed the entire study. 
2.2. Design and materials
The paradigm involved reporting dreams and waking events 
in a diary. A surprise recall task was administered approxi-
mately three weeks later and a surprise recognition task fol-
lowed one week after that. The design was experimental 
insofar as controlling for mode of memory retrieval (recall vs 
recognition), however analyses were to some extent explor-
atory also. A full outline of measures employed and associ-
ated scoring techniques, are outlined below. 
In the first phase of the study participants were required 
to recall dream and waking memories. A standard template 
was used for each report (see Horton, 2008). Participants 
were given a pack of 30 templates (for up to 15 dream and 
15 event reports to be recorded). These templates included 
space for the memory to be handwritten, rating scales and 
information about when and where the memory occurred. 
All reports were given a unique title by participants. Charac-
ters involved in the memory were listed. 
In the second phase ten reports were selected random-
ly consisting of five dreams and five events, for a surprise 
recall task. The titles of these reports were presented to 
the participant as a recall cue. (Debriefs indicated that no 
participants had expected this task to occur, thus we can 
eliminate the confound of deliberate or strategic rehearsal 
of memories.) A control sample rated the titles and deemed 
them to be of comparable salience across individuals, even 
though some were longer than others. Thus these cues ar-
guably relied upon autobiographical memory rather than 
logic in the recall task. Participants were then instructed to 
write as much as they could recall about that event. 
For the third phase (recognition task), the same ten re-
ports were selected and formed the basis of the recogni-
tion items, which were re-presented for memory ratings to 
be undertaken. All tasks were completed in pen and paper 
form. 
2.3. Measures
A number of dependent variables were measured. In the di-
ary phase, word counts of reports were taken along with 
four rating scales (as completed by the participant): emo-
tionality, comprehensibility, personal importance/salience 
(from hereon referred to as, “importance”), and surprise, as 
used and described by Horton, Moulin and Conway (2009). 
Dream characters were listed and identified as familiar (had 
been encountered in waking life, or were recognisable, such 
as a character from a television programme) or unfamil-
iar. The number of familiar and unfamiliar characters were 
counted by the research team. Detail and episodic richness 
scores were assigned to the reports as based upon the rat-
ings of the Autobiographical Memory Interview (AMI; Kopel-
man, Wilson & Baddeley, 1989) on a scale of 0-3. A detail 
score of 3 concerned a detailed personal memory that is 
specific in place and time. A score of 2 involved either “a 
specific personal memory with few or no details” or “a less 
specific event in which time and place are recalled”. A score 
of 1 depicted “a vague personal memory” or “an incident 
that occurred on multiple occasions but no single instance 
is recalled”. Memories corresponding to the latter definition 
omitted any references to the unique episodic nature of the 
memory. Similarly a score of 0 denoted either no recollec-
tion or a response based on general knowledge. The epi-
sodic richness score is a basic extension of the detail score, 
although refers to the specificity of the occurrence. Elabora-
tions almost always contained sensory-perceptual informa-
tion. A score of 3 denoted a memory response “…rich in de-
tail, containing at least 2 elaborations, and [that] evokes an 
impression of true re-experiencing”. A score of 2 denoted a 
response with “moderate detail” also containing at least 2 
elaborations. 1 point referred to “limited detail and/or limited 
elaboration of events” and reports scored 0 contained no 
episodic information. All quotes were taken from the AMI 
scoring guidelines (Kopelman, Wilson and Baddeley, 1989). 
At the recall phase (Phase 2) the same characteristic rat-
ings of detail and episodic richness, as well as word counts, 
were scored by the research team. In addition a detail rating 
(“How much detail can you recall? All the details; most of 
the details; some of the details; a few of the details; none of 
the details”) determined a comparable measure of strength 
of memory across participants. This was followed by a large 
box in which the participant was instructed to record their 
memory of the experience in as much detail as they could. 
Phase 3 took the form of a recognition task. This 40-item 
task was structured such that there were an equal num-
ber (20) of targets and lures. Target sentences came from 
dreams (10 sentences) and waking events (10 sentences). 
Two sentences from each selected report were used as tar-
gets. No report was so brief that it did not include at least 
two sentences. Lures were devised as being related to the 
selected report cues (report titles – 5 dreams and 5 events) 
or non-related (10 sentences). Typically one aspect of the 
cue featured in the non-related lure sentence, whilst at least 
one other was changed, so to create an experience that 
was believable and typical of a dream or event. An exam-
ple of such a sentence, related to the title, “violin at Albert 
Hall”), was, “It was amazing to be playing my violin at such 
a place - the audience was huge”. The non-related lure sen-
tences in each task were administrated to all participants 
(see Appendix A). These sentences were matched along the 
dimensions of emotionality, comprehensibility, personal im-
portance/salience, and surprise as they typically appeared 
International Journal of Dream Research   Volume 4, No. 1 (2011) 11
DI J o RRecall and Recognition of Dreams and Waking Events
Table 1.  Frequency of dreams and events reported in 
 phase 1 (diary). 
dream event
Frequency n reports n reports
5 5 25 6 30
6 3 18 2 12
7 2 14 3 21
8 2 16 1 8
9 0 0 1 9
10 2 20 3 30
11 1 11 1 11
12 0 0 0 0
13 1 13 3 39
14 4 56 2 28
15 5 75 3 45
total 25 248 25 233
for each memory type (as based upon findings from un-
published pilot studies from the author’s lab). That is, the 
dreams were more negatively emotional and surprising, al-
though less comprehensible and salient than the events. 30 
of the 40 items in the recognition task were unique to each 
participant. An example of a target dream sentence was, 
“The garden was very strange and things seemed to be out 
of proportion”. A comparable event target item was, “Gave 
first oral presentation at conference, in Coventry”.
If a presented sentence was judged to have been rec-
ognized, by answering “yes” to: “This sentence appeared 
in one of your dream/event reports” Y/N, participants were 
required to indicate the episodic nature of their recognition 
memory through the recollective experience paradigm (De-
whurst & Conway, 1994; Gardiner, 1988; Rajaram, 1993; Tul-
ving, 1983, 2002). Participants indicated the extent to which 
they remembered the actual experience happening as well 
as the extent to which they remembered reporting it. Both 
ratings featured the recollective experience responses, “re-
member” (indicating an episodic recollection), “know” (indi-
cating a semantic memory), “familiar” (indicating a relatively 
hazy recollection) and “guess”, although only findings con-
cerning remembering the actual experience will be reported 
here, for brevity. 
2.4. Procedure
Initially, the diary phase (Phase 1) required participants to 
record their dreams and waking event experiences. Par-
ticipants were required to record a dream whenever they 
could remember one occurring. Thus, if a dream could be 
recalled from the previous night, they were to record it as 
soon as possible after waking. Whenever a dream template 
was completed, an event template was to be completed for 
an episodic event from the previous day. This meant that if 
two or more dreams were recorded from one night, a corre-
sponding number of event templates were also completed, 
each for an event that had occurred during the preceding 
day. This procedure was continued until as many dreams 
had been recorded as possible within a two-week period. 
Materials were returned to the experimenter at the end of 
this time. This method presented a number of confounds 
which need to be addressed: the recalled dream could have 
influenced the selection of the waking event experience that 
was reported. Participants were instructed not to necessar-
ily select an event that was related to the dream content, 
however one cannot be sure that this did not occur. Further, 
as dreams (and events) were reported in the morning, time 
of day effects may have influenced recall. However the de-
sign was deemed to be non-intrusive to participants and 
preferentially favoured dream recall, which tends to be sub-
stantially more difficult than waking event recall. This point 
is returned to in the discussion. 
The frequency distribution of the reported dream and 
event data for the 25 participants is shown in Table 1. The 
differences between distributions of reported dreams and 
waking events indicated a slight memory advantage for 
dreams, which may reflect the design in that waking events 
only needed to be reported if a dream was reported. Also 
the experiment recruited participants for an investigation of 
dreams, so participants may have prioritized these instruc-
tions. 
Once these materials had been returned by post, there 
was an intervening period of around ten days before Phase 
2 could begin (the maximum of 21 days was employed for 
a couple of participants who were unavailable for the next 
phase until that time). The recall task included the ten titles 
of the dream and event reports. The report’s title acted as a 
cue in the recall task. A reality monitoring task was included, 
requiring participants to identify the source of the memory 
as a dream or an event (results are not presented here, for 
brevity). Participants were encouraged to continue overleaf/
elsewhere if required. The order of the titles (dream/event) 
was randomized.
After another latency period of one week, the recognition 
task (Phase 3) was distributed to participants. Order of pre-
sentation of all items was randomized. In the recognition 
task participants were instructed to identify whether each 
presented sentence had appeared in one of their reports or 
not. If a sentence was recognized, participants indicated the 
extent to which they recollected the experience in question, 
as well as the extent to which they recollected reporting it. 
Full instructions on how to use the ratings were adminis-
tered to participants. 
2.5. Statistical analyses
A series of descriptive and inferential analyses were con-
ducted, comparing characteristics, recallability and recogni-
tion values across dreams and events. In order to ascertain 
how much information of the original reports had been re-
called, length (word count), detail and episodic richness rat-
ings were collected and compared over the original reports 
and at recall. A series of 2 x 2 repeated measures ANOVAs 
were conducted on these data measuring the main effects 
of time (original/recalled), memory type (dream/event), and 
the time x type interactions.
For each individual, the dreams and events that were cor-
rectly remembered and those that were forgotten in the re-
call task were compared upon 9 dimensions: report length 
(word count), detail and episodic richness (on a scale of 0-3, 
as detailed in Kopelman, Wilson & Baddeley, 1989), number 
of familiar and unfamiliar characters featuring in the origi-
nal report, and salience, emotionality, comprehensibility, 
Recall and Recognition of Dreams and Waking Events
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and surprise of the original reports. A series of comparative 
analyses were then conducted in order to identify whether 
any characteristic differences existed between the experi-
ences that were recalled in Phase 2 as opposed to forgot-
ten. 
2.6. Control task.
In order to ascertain that differences between recognition of 
targets as opposed to lures in the task at phase 3 were not 
due to chance or logic (on the basis of dreams being typi-
cally less detailed, for example, than episodic memories, 
Johnson et al., 1984), an opportunity sample of 26 partici-
pants who had not completed the other phases completed 
a recognition task. This control task was composed of 40 
items, taking the same structure and format as a typical 
recognition task. However “target” sentences were taken 
randomly from the reports of 20 participants, as were the 
“lures” (although strictly speaking in this case they were all 
lures). As these sentences described dreams and events 
that should have been unfamiliar to the control group, the 
task was to guess whether the sentence came from a dream 
or event report, and also to indicate whether the sentence 
described something that had happened to the participant 
before. Thus there were directly comparable recognition 
task data. Performance was compared across experimen-
tal and control groups, so to identify whether experimen-
tal participants were performing differently, employing the 
use of memory strategies as opposed to logic. Data have 
been omitted from this paper for brevity, however analyses 
demonstrated that in the experimental group actual memo-
ries were being retrieved, as based on significantly different 
trends being demonstrated within the control group, who 
had to rely upon logic when completing the recognition task. 
3. Results
3.1. Phase 1
Each participant reported a mean of 9.74 dreams and 9.15 
events. Waking events were significantly more important, 
emotional (positively), comprehensible and containing more 
familiar characters than the dreams, which themselves 
contained significantly more unfamiliar characters than the 
events (all p < 0.01).
3.2. Phase 2
No differences were found between the percentage of re-
called events (70%) and the number of recalled dreams 
(67.5%), t(23) = -.340, n.s.. Table 2 details the descriptive 
statistics for these variables. 
Original reports were longer than those in the recall task, 
F(1, 24) = 54.96, p < .001, η2 = .70, 95% CI of difference 
= 22.88–40.54. Experiences reported in the original di-
ary phase (62.18) were significantly longer—about twice as 
long—as those reported in the recall task (30.47) for recalled 
reports. There was also a significant main effect of memory 
type, F(1, 24) = 14.79, p < .001, η2 = .38, 95% CI of differ-
ence = 6.25–20.72, with dreams (53.07) being significantly 
longer than events (39.58). The interaction was also signifi-
cant, F(1, 24) = 23.68, p < .001, η2 = .50, illustrating that 
dreams decreased in length between the time of reporting 
the experience and recalling it, more than the events de-
creased. 
The same analyses were conducted for the detail scores. 
Original reports were much more detailed than the recalled 
reports, F(1, 21) = 41.10, p < .001, η2 = .65. There was no 
significant effect of memory type, F(1, 21) = 0.02, n.s., as 
means were very similar. The interaction also did not reach 
significance, F(1, 21) = 0.33, n.s. As shown in Table 2, 
dreams were slightly more detailed than events, and the ini-
tial reports were more detailed than those of the recall task.
The original experiences (M = 2.11) were also more 
episodically rich than those in the recall task (M = 1.86), 
F(1, 21) = 5.10, p < .05, η2 = 20, 95% CI of difference = 
.20–.47. The main effect of memory type was not significant, 
F(1, 21) = 0.54, n.s., but the interaction was, F(1, 21) = 5.213, 
p < .05, η2 = .20, 95% CI of difference = -1.44–19.36. As for 
the length of the reports, dreams lost their episodic rich-
ness over time more than the events. The source of events 
were monitored significantly more accurately (83.2%) than 
dreams (72.8%), t(24) = -2.40, p < .05. 
Recall performance was similarly high for both dreams 
and events, with 75.87% accuracy for dreams and 77.61% 
for events, t(24) = -.76, n.s.. 
3.3. Phase 3
If a presented target sentence (from an actual report) was 
judged to be “true”, or a lure sentence, “false”, that sen-
tence had been correctly recognized. Table 3 details the 
percentage of hits (correct recognition) and false positives 
(FPs; incorrect recognition of lure sentences) for dreams 
and events. Recognition performance was similar for both 
dreams and events. The means of 77.6 and 71.7 (%) for 
dreams and waking events, respectively, did not differ sig-
nificantly, t(24) = -.96, p > .05. 
Table 2.  Means and standard deviations for report 
 characteristics.
Dream Event
M SD M SD
word
count
Original 74.79 31.93 49.58 23.77
Recall 31.35 22.58 29.59 20.55
Detail Original 2.81 0.19 2.74 0.26
Recall 2.18 0.6 2.26 0.62
Episodic 
richness
Original  2.20 0.23 2.01 0.23
Recall 1.82 0.62 1.91 0.57
Table 3.  Percentage recognition performance and standard 
 deviations for dreams and events.
Hits
False 
positives
Overall
performance
M SD M SD M SD
Dreams 88.2 18.6 29.4 26.1 77.6 21.4
Events 80.7 17.4 33.8 28.0 71.7 23.5
Means 84.4 15.2 31.6 25.9 74.6 21.4
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3.4. Recollective Experience
In addition to making a recognition judgement, sentences 
recognised (either correctly or incorrectly) were judged to 
be either remembered (R), known (K), found familiar (F) or 
guessed (G). Figure 1 illustrates these trends for target sen-
tences, that is sentences that were correctly recognized. 
Patterns of recollective experience differed for the dreams 
and events with events (M= 2.23, SD = 0.09) having higher 
values than dreams (M= 2.05, SD = 0.14), F(1, 20) = 5.07, 
p < .05, η2 = .20, 95% CI of difference = -.34–-.01. This 
indicates that each participant made slightly more recol-
lective experience judgements overall for the events, irre-
spective of what those judgements were. This reflects the 
slightly higher recognition accuracy for events than dreams, 
although this did not reach significance. In terms of recol-
lective experience, a significant main effect was found with 
more R judgements being made and very few guesses, 
F(1.96, 39.21) = 19.75, p < .001, η2 = .50. The repeated mea-
sures ANOVA assumption of sphericity was violated for the 
recollective experience analysis, so the Greenhouse-Geiss-
er corrected degrees of freedom values were adopted. A 
significant memory x recollective experience interaction 
was found, F(3, 60) = 3.59, p < .05, η2 = .15 (see detailed in 
Figure 1). Very few guess responses were used overall and 
these did not differ for dreams and events, t(20) = -1.21, 
p = .24. The waking event memories were more likely to 
be “remembered” (R) than dreams, t(20) = -2.48, p < .05, 
95% CI of difference = -2.90–-2.48, with relatively few K 
and F responses being used. For dreams, slightly fewer R 
responses were adopted but K and F responses were se-
lected more. No significant differences were found between 
dreams and events for the use of K and F judgements, 
t(20) = 1.79, p = .09 and t(20) = .60, p = .55, respectively. 
3.5. Remembered and Forgotten Reports
The characteristics of all the reports that were recalled in 
Phase 2 were compared with those that were not recalled 
for each individual. This aimed to pinpoint specifically which, 
if any, of the characteristics seemed to be most important 
in ensuring that a memory was recalled a month after being 
reported. 
A series of comparative analyses were conducted in order 
to identify whether any characteristic differences existed 
between the experiences that were recalled in the phase 
2 as opposed to forgotten. Table 4 conveys the descriptive 
statistics for the remembered and forgotten reports for the 
characteristics measured. There were few forgotten reports 
to be characterized and compared to the recalled reports. 
This resulted in low degrees of freedom coupled with rela-
tively high standard deviations so few analyses were signifi-
cant. Main effects of memory were found for report lengths, 
F(1, 10) = 8.46, p < .02, η2 = .46, number of unfamiliar char-
acters described in the experience, F(1, 9) = 6.82, p < .05, 
η2 = .43, for comprehensibility, F(1, 8) = 51.78, p < .001, 
η2 = .87, and for surprise, F(1, 8) = 7.66, p < .05, η2 = .44. 
These mirror the overall trends for the reports as described 
above. Furthermore, a significant memory x remembered 
interaction was found for the surprise ratings of the reports, 
F(1, 8) = 5.46, p < .05, η2 = .41. Forgotten reports were less 
surprising overall. Remembered dreams were surprising, 
whilst remembered events were not (as indicated by their 
negative score). Remembered reports were also more sa-
lient than forgotten reports, F(1, 8) = 5.42, p < .05, η2 = .40.
4. Discussion
The retrieval of memories for dreams and waking events 
was manipulated and the memory characteristics, recall 
and recognition performances were compared. Memories 
for dreams and waking events were similarly recallable, and 
recognizable, thus upholding predictions about the compa-
rability of autobiographical remembering for these distinct 
types of experiences. That is, there were no significant dif-
ferences between the recall and recognition performances 
of dreams compared to waking events. This was found 
despite dreams being less characteristically detailed than 
the waking events, in line with previous findings (Johnson 
et al., 1984; Kemp & Burt, 2006; Kemp et al., 2003). Thus 
the reported dreams had been encoded sufficiently for diary 
reporting, but their memory traces were not as strong as 
those for waking experiences. Retrieval processes seem-
ingly operate similarly for dream and waking event memo-
ries. 
Figure 1. Frequency of recollective experience for retrieving the original experience for dreams and evens (target 
  sentences).
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The present data therefore imply there to be some differ-
ences between dream and waking memories, in experiential 
terms. Specifically waking memories are more likely to be 
retrieved with recollective experience, indicating their epi-
sodic nature. Dreams, on the other hand, may be seen to 
be more autobiographical (Conway, 1990; 2001; Horton et 
al., 2009). It should be noted that any analysis or interpreta-
tion of sleep mentation may involve constructive processes 
of the (waking) memory system, thus dream reports may 
not always be pure accounts of sleeping experiences. Such 
construction typifies the autobiographical memory system 
(Conway, 2009). The true nature of the continuity of auto-
biographical memory processes over the sleep-wake cycle 
therefore need to be further explored, with particular empha-
sis upon encoding as well as retrieval of dreams compared 
to those processes of waking events. Manipulating and 
measuring dream encoding presents many methodologi-
cal challenges, not least because the validity of any dream 
memory cannot be objectively ascertained. Future studies 
could nevertheless attempt to investigate the relationships 
between encoding and retrieval. Whilst it is assumed that 
dreams are somewhat difficult to encode at their time of 
occurrence, sampling dreams via systematic awakenings 
may yield more lengthy and valid reports. Daily events could 
be comparably sampled via an alarm system. Differences 
between dream and event reports may often be found, but 
exploring, and subsequently controlling for, contextual over-
lap between encoding and retrieval, would provide further 
insight into the ways in which memory processes can be 
discerned from dream generation. 
Distinguishing between the processes of dream encoding 
and dream generation may be rather difficult. However sam-
pling dream and waking event reports carefully can render 
inferences about encoding versus retrieval, more valid. This 
leads to an important methodological point: Whilst every 
care was taken to ensure that recall and recognition cues 
were taken from reports with a unique title, it is highly likely 
that some dreams contained elements of waking memories, 
and that some events were reported as they related to, or 
were even cued by, the dream that had just been reported 
in Phase 1. We cannot be sure of the extent to which this 
occurred in the present investigation, but it is the nature of 
dreams that they comprise autobiographical memory ref-
erences and fragments from waking life, thus this cannot, 
indeed should not, be entirely controlled for. A more poi-
gnant methodological issue that also concerns possible as-
sociations between dream and event reports, results from 
the instruction to report a waking event memory only when 
a dream memory had been recalled and reported. Although 
dreams always chronologically followed events and were 
reported first, dreams were more difficult to gather than 
events in Phase 1, thus the method ensured that a com-
parable number of dreams and events would be reported 
and used in the study. Secondly, dreams likely came from 
early morning experiences whilst there was no time of day 
limit to the waking event experiences. This reflects the true 
Table 4.  Mean characteristics and standard deviations of remembered and forgotten reports.
Characteristic Dream Event Total
M SD M SD M SD
Word count Remembered 75.79 31.82 53.81 29.31 59.04 42.12
Forgotten 79.64 53.63 52.45 22.05 65.73 29.32
Detail Remembered 2.87 0.23 2.86 0.26 2.85 0.17
Forgotten 2.78 0.34 2.67 0.41 2.75 0.32
Episodic Richness Remembered 2.18 0.27 2.08 0.27 2.75 0.32
Forgotten 2.09 0.52 2.03 0.34 2.06 0.33
Number familiar Remembered 1.67 1.18 1.7 0.84 1.58 0.54
Forgotten 1.60 1.14 1.75 0.66 1.75 0.76
Number unfamiliar Remembered 0.78 0.80 0.17 0.33 0.45 0.42
Forgotten 0.52 0.62 0.18 0.53 0.3 0.43
Salience Remembered -0.15 0.98 0.78 0.86 0.38 0.7
Forgotten -0.21 1.19 0.15 1.12 0.16 0.86
Emotionality Remembered -0.39 0.52 0.41 0.83 0.05 0.47
Forgotten -0.27 0.69 0.24 0.84 -0.07 0.37
Comprehensibility Remembered -0.27 0.96 1.23 0.86 0.42 0.75
Forgotten -0.34 0.95 1.26 0.57 0.35 0.51
  
Surprise
Remembered 0.80 0.57 -0.35 1.04 0.18 0.64
Forgotten 0.74 0.80 0.18 1.00 0.66 0.65
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nature of a dream’s occurrence. Ideally future investigations 
would overcome such order and time of day effects, per-
haps by employing systematic awakening procedures, such 
as alarms. 
A further method of understanding the nature, and po-
tential predictability, of the future retrievability of a memory, 
comes from comparing the experiences that were retained 
for subsequent access (those “remembered”) to those that 
were not retained (“forgotten”). In the present study, when 
comparing the characteristics of the experiences that had 
been remembered as opposed to forgotten, many of the 
analyses did not reach significance. The statistical insignifi-
cance of other analyses may have been due to a number of 
factors. Firstly, dream and event reports may not have any 
characteristic in particular that determines whether an ex-
perience is remembered or forgotten. Rather, other factors 
could determine this, such as conscious encoding upon 
waking, or subsequent rehearsal. Secondly, the sample size 
was too small, considering the low numbers of reports than 
had been forgotten and the great variability in the values, 
for any significant effects to emerge. As events were bet-
ter recalled than dreams, and they were significantly more 
salient, positively emotional and comprehensible, it seems 
that these characteristics may be particularly important in 
determining the successful retrieval of an autobiographical 
memory. However remembered (recalled) experiences were 
significantly more salient than forgotten ones, and remem-
bered dreams were (mildly) more surprising than forgotten 
dreams (and indeed remembered events). This highlights 
the influence of salience upon subsequent retrieval of a 
memory (Cohen & MacNeilage, 1974). The concept of sa-
lience is worthy of further study (Parke & Horton, 2009) as it 
could either refer to personal importance, as in the present 
study, or it could refer to the strength of a memory trace. 
The present experiment provided insights into the gen-
eral nature of dream recall. Participants were able to recall 
dreams when required to do so, in great detail in the case 
of many dreams. Thus dream recall is not as poor as some 
authors would have us believe (Hobson et al., 2000; Meier, 
Ruef, Ziegler & Hall, 1968; Reed, 1974). Theoretically, this 
implies that dream memories can be accessible and de-
tailed, in line with waking experiences, providing that dream 
memories are recalled and reported soon after waking, 
which implies that dream encoding needs to occur rather 
quickly upon awakening. Investigating the time course of 
dream memory decay might also provide further insight into 
the mechanisms and possibilities of dream encoding, when 
the wake-state is disrupted 
It has been well documented that some individuals are 
much more likely than others to recall their dreams. In the 
present study, sample attrition was high, resulting in a sam-
ple biased towards dream recall. Measures of dream recall 
will often be muddied by such sampling bias. Nevertheless 
the trends from the present experiment regarding dreams’ 
comparability to waking memories are clear and the diary 
paradigm provides a valid and systematic design for the 
study of real world autobiographical remembering, espe-
cially as participants were not informed that their memory 
would be tested for the dreams and events that they re-
ported. Another design possibility would be to collect data 
concerning the personality characteristics of the sample, 
known to correlate highly with dream recall, and to control 
for such individual differences trends. 
Overall, these data demonstrate that memories for 
dreams are autobiographical experiences that are recallable 
and recognizable, providing the dream memory trace is suf-
ficiently encoded in the form of being recalled and reported 
in a diary. While dreams are characteristically less detailed 
than waking experiences, they are comparable to them. 
The relative difficulties in recalling dreams as compared to 
events may reflect how dreams are less rehearsed and less 
salient than memories for waking events. As to whether this 
is the result of problems at the level of encoding, likely due 
to physiology of the sleeping brain, or the result of attend-
ing to waking memories more than dreams, remains to be 
disentangled. Data from recognition tasks described here 
have demonstrated that, if recalled and recorded, dream 
memories are as accessible as memories for waking events. 
However, their lack of characteristic detail, coupled with the 
effort taken to report the dream upon waking, indicates that 
reconstructive processes of the autobiographical memory 
system may typify dream recall. As the difference in recall-
ability of dreams and events disappeared when measuring 
current experiences compared to retrospective experiences 
(see Horton, 2008), it is implied that given the appropriate 
means to do so (a dream diary and intent), dreams can be 
recalled and are comparable to waking autobiographical in 
terms of retrieval trends in the medium term, at least. As 
dream recall had to rely here upon waking encoding pro-
cesses to some degree during initial (diary) reporting, any 
differences between dream and waking event memory 
characteristics, recallability and/or recognizeability refer to 
how those memories had been stored, consolidated and 
retrieved over time. That is, this paradigm did not allow for 
distinguishing between encoding processes to be inferred. 
Nevertheless these processes may well be comparable to 
everyday methods of dream remembering. 
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Appendix A
Unrelated lure sentences for recognition tasks:
Dreams
• Later we were at a party with the people I live with.
• My friend told us she was pregnant and we didn’t know 
what to say, so we nervously congratulated her.
• At a Spanish themed bar, having some drinks with 
friends.
• I was rushing to get ready in time and suddenly I was 
changed and ready to go.
• I saw what was on the exam paper before I had sat the 
exam!
Events
• I had just nipped out to the shop to buy some milk and 
I bumped into an old friend.
• I watched TV with some friends and ate pizza.
• I went for a walk as I was feeling so stressed about it.
• We went out for something to eat, ended up staying out 
until 1am.
• I went to the lecture, fell asleep through most of it and 
then left with my friends.
